This chapter describes major events of the period of the history of Northern Ireland from 1992 until June 1996, which is often defined as the latest round of the peace process.
It is clear that the chapter can cover only those of the events of that period which seem to have a certain significance for the process as such. The text is based mainly on newspaper reports, carefully selected materials from the World Wide Web and interviews with relevant people in Northern Ireland.
It should be also stressed that the selection of the events and the interpretation of their importance could be found to be subjective to a certain extent. I would like to point out that I have done everything possible to check the accuracy of both the described events and their analytical interpretation.
On April 10, 1992, two IRA bombs exploded in the centre of London. The tension in Northern Ireland rose when the Ulster Defence Force was banned in August. 76 people were killed by republican and loyalist terrorists in this year. (1)There was little cause to believe that 1992 could bring peace closer.
Sinn Fein's close connection to the IRA raised the question whether Sinn Fein should be banned by the governments in Dublin and London. The question was very important. As most of analysts agree, if the British government had decided to ban Sinn Fein, the current peace process might not have been possible. But the British government decided to avoid confrontation with the IRA in late 1992, seeking instead to draw the republican movement's leaders into constitutional discussion.
In a December 1992 speech, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Sir Patrick Mayhew suggested that if the IRA abandoned violence, "the whole range of responses that we have had to make to that violence could, and would inevitably, be looked at afresh". (2) Mayhew's statement inaugurated the latest round of peace process, as all sides of the conflict, and especially Sinn Fein and the IRA, saw in it an opportunity to start peace talks.
SDLP leader John Hume and Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams met several times in reaction to the new position of the British government and launched a peace initiative (in April 1993) confirming that negotiations were very important for reaching a settlement in Northern Ireland. The British and Irish governments responded positively to the moves, and support grew for all-party talks on Northern Ireland, one of the key requirements of Sinn Fein. But the situation deteriorated in October 1992, when an IRA bomb killed 10 people and wounded 61 in a busy Belfast shopping district. A week later, loyalist gunmen opened fire in a nationalist pub, killing seven and wounding 11. As many analysts suggest, this wave of violence forced both Dublin and London to act.
On 15 December 1993, John Major and the Taoiseach (prime minister) of the Irish Republic, made a Joint Declaration (also known as the Downing Street Declaration) which, as they claimed, was intended to complement and underpin the political talks process and the search for a comprehensive political settlement. The Declaration set out the constitutional principles and political realities which guarantee the vital interests of both sides of the community in Northern Ireland. The British government repeated Northern Ireland's statutory constitutional guarantee and reaffirmed that it would "uphold the democratic wish of a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland". (3)
The British government agreed that "it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish."
Both governments promised that they would introduce the necessary legislation to give effect to this, "or equally to any measure of agreement on future relationships in Ireland, freely determined by the people of Ireland without external impediment".
The Taoiseach, on behalf of the Irish government, said that "it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland in the absence of the freely given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland."
Also, both governments agreed "that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. In such circumstances, democratically mandated parties which had established a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods, and which had shown that they would abide permanently by the democratic process, would be free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join dialogue in due course between the Government and the other political parties on the way ahead."
Although the language of the diplomatic statement could be confusing, the two main messages of the Declaration are quite simple: 1. the agreement accepted a possible end to Ireland's partition but promised no change without approval of the majority, 2. the agreement promised to hold all-party talks on the future of Northern Ireland, with Sinn Fein being allowed to enter talks if the IRA laid down its arms.
It is clear that the Downing Street Declaration is one of the milestones of the history of Northern Ireland's conflict especially because it "amounted to a formal offer to republicans of entry into politics if IRA violence ceased" (4)and stressed that Britain does not have any "selfish interests in the province".
The Declaration was welcomed by nationalists, although some of them viewed it as not going far enough. It was strongly opposed by Unionists who feared they had been sold out. There are no doubts that the Declaration was a big victory for republicans.
It is worth to mention that the conventional view of the Downing Street Declaration and the August 1994 IRA ceasefire as the direct results of John Major's efforts was recently undermined by a investigative report in the Independent. (5) The evidence suggests that John Major repeatedly attempted to persuade the Irish government to abandon the peace initiative which led to the Downing Street Declaration because "he did not believe that the historic declaration would lead to a cessation of the IRA violence." The prime minister signed the declaration only after "intense pressure" from the Irish Taoiseach and the SDLP leader John Hume.
Secondly, the report shows that the IRA and Sinn Fein had direct input into early drafts of the declaration, with "Sinn Fein writing several drafts and passing them on at secret meetings with an Irish government representative".
This revelation helps to understand why the Downing Street declaration is considered to be a very important victory for republican circles.
The IRA and republican circles pondered the Downing Street Declaration and its consequences through much of the spring of 1994, "seeking clarification". On March 11, the IRA launched two mortar attacks on Heathrow airport. Gerry Adams commented on the attacks by saying that they will "accelerate the peace process". (6) In April 1994, IRA called for a three-day ceasefire, the first outside the traditional Christmas truces since 1975.
And then, on August 31, 1994, the historic moment came. The IRA announced a complete cessation of military operations. In September, it declared an indefinite ceasefire.
I quote a significant part of the IRA statement, as it can serve as a good illustration of this stage of the peace process.
"Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of Oglaigh na hErieann have decided that as of midnight, Wednesday, August 31st, there will be a complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly. (...) Our struggle has seen many gains and advances made by nationalists and for the democratic position. We believe that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting settlement has been created. We are therefore entering into a new situation in a spirit of determination and confidence, determined that the injustices which created this conflict will be removed and confident in the strength and justice of our struggle to achieve this.
We note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution nor was it presented as such by its authors. A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations. Others, not least the British government, have a duty to face up to their responsibilities. It is our desire to significantly contribute to the creation of a climate which will encourage this. We urge everyone to approach this situation with energy, determination and patience." (7)
There are no doubts that the IRA ceasefire was a key moment of the peace process. As one commentator noted, "the IRA ceasefire seemed the natural culmination of the peace process." (8)
This was followed by the announcement of the ceasefire of the loyalist paramilitary groups on 13 October 1994:
"... after having received confirmations and guarantees in relation to the Northern Ireland constitutional position within the United Kingdom, as well as other assurances, and, in the belief that the democratically expressed wishes of the greater number of people in Northern Ireland will be respected and upheld, the Combined Loyalist Military Command will universally cease all operational hostilities as from 12 midnight on Thursday, Oct. 13, 1994. The permanence of our ceasefire will be completely dependent upon the continued cessation of all nationalist/republican violence; the sole responsibility for a return to war lies with them. (...)The Union is safe. (...)
Let us firmly resolve to respect our differing views of freedom, culture and aspiration and never again permit our political circumstance to degenerate into bloody warfare. We are on the threshold of a new and exciting beginning with our battles in future being political battles, fought on the side of honesty, decency and democracy against the negativity of mistrust, misunderstanding and malevolence so that together we can bring forth a wholesome society in which our children and their children will know the meaning of peace." (9)
I do not quote politicians often in this text, as it is clear that their words have to be read "symptomatically", it means that it is much more important to analyse the hidden meanings of their statements or the general trends behind them.
But the contents of the two statements I just mentioned can help us very much to understand one critical misunderstanding of the period of the peace process after the IRA ceasefire, the misunderstanding leading to the Docklands bombing and the resumption of IRA violence 18 months later. I think that an analysis of them can illustrate the main political trends in this period.
As all the people I interviewed in Northern Ireland agreed, the IRA ceasefire was one of the greatest moments of their lives, as it gave them hope and a chance to live in peace after 25 years of violence. For many of them, there was only one interpretation of the IRA ceasefire - the IRA and extreme republicans were more or less satisfied with recent developments and gave up their armed struggle, peace had reached the province, the war was over, a new chapter of the history began.
Of course, experienced analysts warned that this was not what the IRA statement meant, but doubts like that were lost in waves of optimism. The loyalists' statement, quoted above, also bears signs of misjudging the IRA's statement. It speaks about "confirmations and guarantees in relation to the Northern Ireland constitutional position within the United Kingdom." It claims that "The Union is safe."
The IRA recognised "the potential of the current situation" and expressed its will "to enhance the democratic peace process" but at the same time stressed that "A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations."
As commentators point out, while Unionists saw the events as the end of the "Troubles" and therefore their victory, the IRA and Sinn Fein considered them to be just the beginning of a period of negotiations and therefore a significant victory for nationalists.
At the end of October, John Major announced that "following a review of their actions, which had been more compelling than their words", he was prepared to make a "working assumption" that the IRA ceasefire was intended to be permanent. Government lifted the broadcasting ban against Sinn Fein leaders' voices being aired. The United States lifted a ban on official contact with Sinn Fein and granted a visa to Gerry Adams, and John Major lifted exclusion orders on Adams and Martin McGuiness, which had prevented them visiting mainland Britain. Later in the year, the British Army announced its first Northern Ireland troop reduction and British government officials held their first public meeting with Sinn Fein in 22 years which was followed by exploratory dialogue with loyalist representatives.
As British officials claimed, there were three main fields for the dialogue with Sinn Fein: "1. to explore the basis on which Sinn Fein would come to be admitted to an inclusive political talks process, 2. to exchange views on how Sinn Fein would be able over a period of time to play the same part as the current constitutional parties in the public life of Northern Ireland, 3. to examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence." (10)
It is relatively easy to evaluate the second half of 1994 from the point of view of its significance for the peace process. As analysts agree, this period was probably the most promising period in the history of the conflict. Both sides committed themselves to use and support only peaceful and democratic methods. British government started dialogue with representatives of Sinn Fein, security measures in Northern Ireland were dramatically reduced, the Province was experiencing a level of normality unknown for many years. But as Adams told republican rally in Belfast, "The IRA haven't gone away."
As I already explained above, the most important components of the long confrontation did not disappear.
On 22 February 1995, John Major and the Taoiseach John Bruton launched "A New Framework for Agreement" document which sets out the British and Irish governments proposals for relationships within the island of Ireland and between the two governments. Shortly afterwards the British government launched separately its own proposals for possible new democratic institutions in Northern Ireland - "A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland."
Although these frameworks did not have any significant influence on the peace process, I have to mention briefly their contents as they would provide a basis for first rounds of all-party talks.
The governments stressed many times in the texts that they did not predetermine any outcome of the talks process because "agreement by the parties, and then by the people, is the key." (11)The text claimed that "any proposals that emerge from collective talks will require the agreement of not only the parties, but also the people in a referendum and, finally in Parliament, before they can be implemented." Among many proposals, the Frameworks suggested creating "a North/South body, comprising elected representatives from, and accountable to, a Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament, to deal with matters designated by the two Governments in the first instance in agreement with the parties."
As I have already mentioned, although the documents contained suggestions that might be important for the future of Northern Ireland, their significance seemed to be overlooked or even forgotten by nearly all sides of the conflict. One explanation of this fact, suggested by several people I interviewed, is very simple - the documents dealt with issues which were not relevant to any of the stages of the peace process. At the time of their publication, peace talks seemed to be too faraway to consider them seriously.
From the point of view of the peace process, another event turned out to be very important. The British government and the leader of the UUP David Trimble formulated a new precondition that some IRA weapons had to be decommissioned. Only after this "confidence-building measure" Sinn Fein could be included in all-party talks. As analysts point out, this was practically impossible for the IRA and "the peace process ground to a halt." (12) Republicans felt betrayed and Sinn Fein broke off talks with the British government. The Irish government postponed summit talks with Britain, refusing to accept the precondition.
Many people I interviewed in Northern Ireland felt that the British precondition was an "absolutely useless" step which slowed the process down. Several explanations of the John Major's position can be found. Some analysts argued it was just a point of principle for him, another viewed it as "a deliberate delaying tactics designed to cut republicans down to size and put manners on them." (13)
In order to push the process ahead, the governments in London and Dublin announced what they called a "twin-track" approach to the peace process under which all-party talks and decommissioning of arms would be separately explored.
One - the political - track was intended "to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent."
The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and established an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue and "report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that." (14)
At the end of November, Bill Clinton became the first US president to visit Northern Ireland, what was seen as an important gesture supporting the peace process.
On January 24, 1996, the International Body on Arms Decommissioning (generally know as the Mitchell Commission), chaired by formed U.S. Senator and Clinton's Ireland economic advisor George Mitchell, published its report.
The report on illegal arms in Northern Ireland concluded that paramilitary groups will not decommission weapons in advance of all-party talks, as had demanded by the British government.
"After careful consideration, (...) we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. (...) That is the reality with which all concerned must deal." (15) Instead of it the report suggested that "the parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after, as the parties now urge."
The report also laid out six principles (known as "the Mitchell Principles") of non-violence and democracy and recommended that all parties involved in talks should make a commitment to them. They include absolute commitments to "peaceful means of resolving political issues" and eventual disarmament of paramilitary organisations and a commitment that if those involved in the talks disagree with their eventual outcome they would oppose it by exclusively peaceful methods. It also mentioned the possibility of creating an elected body, as "an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence."
The suggestions were welcomed by all sides of the conflict, except Unionists, who rejected the all-party talks without arms decommissioning. The Mitchell's suggestions seemed to create a new path to the beginning of negotiations especially because they stressed the impossibility of the IRA's surrender in advance of talks. A new opportunity for peace seemed to have been created.
The Independent wrote: "The Prime Minister should seize upon it. (...) Not to accept it would risk derailing the peace process completely." (16)
The British government claimed that it was under no obligation to accept any of the report's recommendations. After a short hesitation, John Major accepted the possibility of parallel decommissioning, but at the same time he replaced this demand with his proposal for an election to a consultative convention. Those who achieved mandates would be accepted at all-party talks. Analysts saw this proposal as another part of the delaying tactic employed by the British government.
This announcement caused a wave of anger not only in republican circles in the Province, but also in the Irish Republic. The idea of an assembly was strongly opposed not only be Sinn Fein, but also by the SDLP. John Hume erupted in the House of Commons, blaming the Prime Minister for "playing politics with the lives of people of Northern Ireland." He also claimed that Major's prime concern was ensuring Unionist support in the Commons as the majority of Conservatives dwindled.
This argument, although strongly denied by Major several times, was found to be quite reasonable by several analysts I interviewed. At that time Hume's angry outburst was seen as a "mistaken attack on democracy". One month later, the Times noted, it looked as "a dire forewarning." (17)
Nevertheless, the situation was generally evaluated as a little bit more optimistic and there are no doubts that the Mitchell Commission played a significant role in the peace process.
On February 9, Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams told a local radio station in Ulster in the afternoon that the IRA's ceasefire was "total and permanent". (18)
Just before 6pm RTE (the Irish Republic's radio and television network) was told in coded warning that the ceasefire is at an end. At 7.01pm a bomb exploded in London's Docklands.
After 17 months, the dream about peace ended.
On February 9, the explosion of a huge home-made device with half a ton of explosives planted in a small lorry in the Docklands area of London caused immediate damage estimated at £85m, bringing to an end the IRA ceasefire after 17 months of peace. Two people were killed, more than one hundred were injured. The IRA later said that "regrettable injuries" might have been avoided if police had responded promptly to a "clear and specific warning." (19)
The bombing provoked a huge wave of condemnations around the world. John Major called the bombing an "evil act" and challenged Sinn Fein to "say now that their campaign of violence has stopped." Also the Irish government said it wanted "the ceasefire to be restored immediately." Bill Clinton promised to "do all I can ensure that the enemies of peace do not succeed."
Gerry Adams stressed he had "no pre-knowledge" of the operation and called for urgent talks with the Northern Ireland Office. He repeated that republicans still "remain wedded to our peace process," promising that "Sinn Fein will use whatever political influence we have." (20)
On February 15, the IRA placed a bomb in a telephone box in Piccadilly Circus in London. A phone warning gave police time to locate and diffuse the bomb. On the following Sunday, February 18, an IRA member was killed and many people injured when a device he was carrying exploded on a bus in the centre of London. The bomb is believed to have gone off as the terrorist (later named as Edward O'Brien) was priming it for detonation.
After 17 months of peace, security was dramatically stepped up on the British mainland and in Northern Ireland, where the Royal Ulster Constabulary were wearing flak jackets and the army returned to the streets. "The mood is closer to despair then to mere dismay," reported the Independent from Belfast. (21)
Let me now discuss reasons leading to the resumption of IRA violence.
The text of the IRA statement reads:
"It is with great reluctance that the leadership of Oglaigh na hireann announces that the complete cessation of military operations will end at 6 p.m. on February 9th, this evening.(...)
The cessation presented an historic challenge for everyone and Oglaigh na hEireann commends the leadership of nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. (...) Instead of embracing the peace process, the British Government acted in bad faith with Mr Major and the Unionist leaders squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict.
Time and again, over the last 18 months, selfish party political and sectional interests in the London parliament have been placed before the rights of the people of Ireland.(...)
The resolution of the conflict in our country demands justice.
It demands an inclusive negotiated settlement. (...)"(22)
The text of the IRA statement illustrates the most important factor leading the organisation to the bombing campaign. As analysts agree, the campaign was renewed as a direct reaction to the John Major's proposal about an election. "It was probably the last straw for the IRA," noted the Independent. (23)
The issue of decommissioning had been dropped by the British government after the recommendations of the Mitchell report. But immediately after this, a new precondition was created - precondition of an election to an assembly. The republican circles came to the conclusion that the new precondition was yet more evidence of the delaying tactics employed by the British government.
Sinn Fein representatives I interviewed in Belfast confirmed the interpretation, stressing that the British government was to be blamed for the peace process collapse, for betraying the nationalist community and for losing the chance to start negotiations. But not only republican circles held such opinions. "Downing Street's bungled handling of the Mitchell report allowed peace to slip away," noted the Guardian. (24)
Moreover, the very concept of any election sounded to the nationalist circles as a possibility of a return to the Stormont government. The introduction of the idea of an election simply created the feeling that John Major was not serious about bringing Sinn Fein to talks.
The same issue caused also a rift between Dublin and London after the Taoiseach warned that it would be a "serious mistake" (25) promote elections as a part of all party talks.
After analysing the situation, the IRA came to the conclusion that the only thing the British government understood was the use of force.
Very interesting details of the resumption of the IRA violence were published by the Sunday Times. As the article suggests, (25) "The IRA was given an ultimatum by its own hardliners: we bomb or we split. It chose to bomb." It claims that the whole new offensive had been in planning for a long time by hardliners from the border regions of Northern Ireland. The resumption of the bombing campaign may have been forced by the determination to avoid a split. The article also names the man police believe made the Docklands bomb (Ciaran Chambers) and the members of the IRA army council and also speculates that Gerry Adams must have known about the preparations.
Let me now describe briefly the period after the Docklands bombing from the point of view of the peace process. Both the British and the Irish governments stressed that it was crucial to do everything possible to restart the process and, eventually, to start all-party talks. However, for long time they were not able to agree how to do this.
There were three main options how to push the peace process ahead at this stage:
1. Referendum
One of the possibilities, suggested by the SDLP leader John Hume, was a referendum, to be simultaneously held in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The first question would have asked voters whether they disapproved of violence for any purpose, second, whether they wanted to see all parties to start talks.
Both questions would almost certainly produce a "yes" verdict by a large majority. Results of such a referendum would -the SDLP believed - help to push the peace process ahead.
Although John Major promised to "examine this option," it was not accepted by him in the end, as he probably did not believe such a referendum could help.
2. Dayton-style proximity talks
The Irish government called for Dayton-style proximity talks, in which all the parties, probably under US chairmanship, would convene in one building for parallel sessions on the model of the Dayton peace conference, leading to peace in Bosnia.
The Irish government strongly opposed an election for long time. The Taoiseach John Bruton said an election - proposed by Unionists - would be "a mistake" which would "pour petrol on the flames" adding that proximity talks could restore the ceasefire. This possibility was also supported by the SDLP which continued strongly to object to any type of elective process rather than a direct move to all-party talks. John Hume said elections would lead to chaos and warned against "slamming the door" on Sinn Fein. (27)
3. Elections to an assembly
The British government, however, insisted on its original plan for elections to "give the electoral mandates and confidence" which would lead to all-party negotiations. (28) As analysts stress, it was practically impossible for Major to abandon this plan as its abandonment could be understood as a concession to terrorists.
The negotiations took several weeks. The Irish Premier pushed for an announcement of a fixed date for all-party talks because - he claimed - if Sinn Fein was given a date, the IRA could consider a new ceasefire. John Major was reluctant, stressing that it would show that terror paid off. In the end, a compromise solution was reached: Dublin agreed with elections to set up an assembly, London granted a firm date for all-party talks - the concession which Sinn Fein had demanded above all others in recent months.
Both Premiers met on February 28 and released a communique the next day. They agreed that "an elective process would have to be broadly acceptable and lead immediately and without further preconditions to the convening of all-party negotiations with a comprehensive agenda" and that "all-party negotiations will be convened on Monday 10 June 1996. " (29)
The document repeated the demand that the IRA had to resume its ceasefire before Sinn Fein was allowed to participate in talks.
There are no doubts that this announcement is very important in the history of conflict, especially because it set up a date for all-party talks. There are also no doubts that the announcement was a big victory for nationalist circles, especially for Sinn Fein and the IRA and - at the same time - a significant defeat for John Major, who was heavily criticised from many sides for doing concessions to terrorists. "The peace process may be back on the road - but at what political and moral cost?" asked the Times. (30)
The crucial section of the communique - paragraph 12 - states that after elections to a peace forum, Sinn Fein and other parties need only "address" the need to decommission terrorist weapons. This formulation, analysts stress, was in sharp contrast to London's position before the Docklands bombing, when John Major insisted that the IRA would need to begin decommissioning in parallel with peace talks. And, as many Unionists pointed out, in comparison with London's earlier position, the contrast was even greater since in December 1993 John Major insisted that the IRA would have to decommission all weapons before all-party talks. "Compromise is not a dirty word. It is an absolute necessity for peace," the Prime Minister claimed, defending his decision.
As many people I talked to in Northern Ireland agreed, his decision was absolutely crucial for saving the peace process. Although Sinn Fein president Adams claimed that a new IRA ceasefire was "mostly unlikely" (31) after the communique was published, the decision opened a door to a new chapter of the conflict: to elections and - possibly - peace negotiations.
Although I believe I have already pointed out all the most important aspects of the period since the end of the ceasefire, let me evaluate briefly this stage of the peace process which is considered by some analysts to be even more significant than the period after the ceasefire was proclaimed.
As I stressed, republican circles - especially Sinn Fein and the IRA, scored one of the greatest victories of recent years, proving that "violence pays off" and terror is "the only thing London understands." The British government was forced by the renewal of the bombing campaign of the IRA to take decisive steps by setting up dates for elections and peace talks.
Without doing this, Northern Ireland could slip back to the nightmare of endless rounds of violence.
It is also significant to stress at this point one aspect of the renewal of violence - IRA campaign did not return to Northern Ireland. As commentators pointed out, if it did, this would probably mean a resumption of loyalist violence. Loyalist paramilitary groups warned that the IRA campaign could bring a violent reaction from them. "We will give blow for blow," (32) declared a statement from the Combined Loyalist Military Command, which speaks for the three main paramilitary groups - the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association and Red Hand Commandos.
1. David Butler: The Trouble with reporting Northern Ireland (Avebury, Aldershot, England. 1995), p.82
2. WWW: The History of Ireland
3. Britain in the USA - Northern Ireland
4. the Independent on Sunday, 11.2.1996, p.21
5. the Independent, 24.4.1996, p.1
6. the Times, 11.2.1996
7. The Irish History on the Web
8. the Independent on Sunday, 11.2.1996
9. The Irish History on the Web
10. Britain in the USA - Northern Ireland
11. Ibid.
12. the Independent on Sunday 11.2.1996, p.21
13. Ibid.
14. Communique of the British and Irish Governments, 28 November, 1995, Britain in the USA - Northern Ireland
15. The report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning (the Mitchell Commission), Britain in the USA - Northern Ireland
16. the Independent, 24.1.1996, p.14
17. the Times, 11.2.1996
18. Ibid.
19. the Independent on Sunday, 11.2.1996, p.1
20. the Times, 11.2.1996
21. the Independent, 20.2.1996, p.1
22. The Irish History on the Web
23. the Independent, 12.2.1996, p.17
24. the Guardian, 22.2.1996, Section 2, p.2
25. the Independent, 12.2.1996, p.2
26. the Sunday Times, 18.2.1996
27. the Independent, 12.2.1996, p.1
28. the Independent, 13.2.1996, p.1
29. Britain in the USA - Northern Ireland
30. the Times, 3.3.1996
31. the Independent, 1.3.1996, p.1
32. the Independent, 13.3.1996, p.1