Polish 20th-Century History
Sanacja
"The effects of the coup were profound, but not sensational. Pi³sudski refused to take formal control of political affairs, preferring to prolong a pseudo-parliamentary charade, than to rule by personal dictatorship." [Davies, God's Playground, vol. II, 422]
Kazimierz Bartel (1882-1941) became the first prime minister of the new government, and Ignacy Moœcicki (1867-1946) was appointed president instead of Wojciechowski. The régime that was created by Pi³sudski in 1926 adopted the slogan SANACJA, or Cleansing, and has been known as such ever since.
Pi³sudski did not really have any clear programme: "My programme is the diminution of robbery and the pursuit of honesty", he said in a speech to the Sejm on 29 May 1926. His main reason for taking power seems to have been the Right's proximity to government over the preceding months. Yet he was preparing for what he called a final showdown with the politicians "if they return to their former habit". The POW Legionnaires were still among his closest advisers (Walezy S³awek, Józef Beck, Kazimierz Œwitalski).
S³awek began creating an instrument for power in the BBWR (Blok bezpartyjny dla wspó³pracy z rz¹dem — Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government), founded 1927, intending to stage-manage the forthcoming elections. The role of parliament was to voice occasional mild criticism of the régime's government, not to denounce it. Pi³sudski was not interested in economics, and Bartel managed to pursue the same pre-coup policies of balancing the budget and stabilising the currency. A slight economic recovery came about as a result of the sanacja. In respect of minorities, the régime announced that assimilation policies were now rejected in favour of equality and secured quite a measure of support among the Jews, but was hugely unsuccessful with other groups.
Pi³sudski's primary interests, besides peace in Warsaw, were in the areas of foreign policy and the armed forces. His anti-Russian stance made the policy of "eyes east" holds throughout his 10 years as Poland's unofficial dictator, and yet his political approach was to perceive enemies to West and East. In the Army, a Pi³sudski-ite past became crucial. In 1926 only 10% of army officers had served in the Legions, but by 1939 that figure had risen to 70%. They usually lacked formal military training, and had won their advancement in the Polish-Russian War. This led to the overrating of cavalry to the detriment of armour and aircraft.
In October 1926 a banquet was held at Nieœwie¿ on the Radziwi³³ estates between the régime (represented by Pi³sudski himself) and various industrialists and landowners. It proved that the régime was not going to be radically socialist. The Christian Nationalists split into two groups, some supporting the régime, some against.
Sept 1926 ND tries to limit régime's power in Sejm by parliamentary methods.
Nov 1926 First imposition of media control.
March 1927 Régime's budget passed.
4-11 March Election: BBWR 25%; Right 9%; Centre 10%; Left 26%; Minorities 18%; Communists 7%.
The BBWR and the Left had a clear majority, but parliament rejected Bartel as premier and elected Daszyñski (a socialist).
14 Nov 1928 PPS, PSL and other peasant parties of CENTROLEW formed a Consultative Committee to defend democracy and the constitution. Immediately the inner circle of colonels, Pi³sudski's circle of Legionnaires, encouraged the government to take a harder line against parliament.
Feb 1929 Czechowicz's responsibility for government credits was to be investigated by parliament. Bartel and Czechowicz resigned and Colonel Kazimierz Œwitalski became PM.
29 June 1929 Czechowicz trial - government implicated, Sejm vindicated.
Oct 1929 Wall Street Crash affected Poland severely. The régime again moved to rigid monetary policies to protect the z³oty, and unemployment rose rapidly. On the Right, the ND united with other minor fascist-like parties to form OWP (Obóz Wielkiej Polski — Greater Poland Camp). Pi³sudski was unhappy about such developments, and when the Sejm opened its winter sitting on 31 October, the opposition was expected to react strongly against the régime, but this was milder than anticipated.
29 March 1930 S³awek becomes PM, marking the introduction of a new, harder line.
20 June 1930 Centrolew and OWP issue a statement demanding the "removal of the government of the Dictator Józef Pi³sudski".
30 Aug 1930 Parliament dissolved. Elections announced for 16/23 November.
9/10 Sept 1930 Eleven of Centrolew's leaders arrested and arrests continued up to the election. By mid-October several thousand people (including 64 MPs) had been arrested and interned in the fortress of Brzeœæ. The Centrolew refused to go underground, convinced that the elections would give a result in their favour, but were shocked by the régime's repressive measures. The reaction of most of the population was confusion and indifference. The régime was not ready to leave the forthcoming elections to chance, invalidating electoral lists and exerting pressure particularly in Eastern Poland.
16/23 Nov 1930 Election results:
BBWR 47% (247); Right 13% (62); Centrolew 21% (107); Communists 2.5% (5); Minorities 14.5% (33).
The BBWR had an absolute majority. Pi³sudski informed the inner cabinet on 18 November: "We have 5 years of the most perfect quiet, and we must know how to make use of it."
AFTER BRZEή
Pi³sudski was not happy about the measures he had felt obliged to take, and partly withdrew from political life again. He was also becoming very ill. His associate Kazimierz Œwitalski noted that the Commander isolated himself consciously. He trusted only those who were part of the inner circle, from the Legions, the POW, who in turn placed army officers in state positions. The proportion of uniformed to civilian ministers was 9:6 in S³awek's cabinet (Dec 1930—May 1931). Under Aleksander Prystor (May 1931—May 1933) it was 8:5, while under Janusz Jêdrzejewicz (May 1933—May 1934) it went down to 5:12. The Military were especially prominent throughout the 1930s in the Ministry of the Interior, and Foreign Affairs, and this centralised state meant that most provincial governors and those dealing with the nationalities and security were army officers. Often they were incompetent, particularly when entrusted with economic matters, and some made full use of their position. The "sejmocracy", as Pi³sudski had contemptuously termed the parliamentary system up to 1926, was replaced by a closed caste system.
The new régime quickly wound up the Czechowicz trial in the Sejm to its own satisfaction, and debate in the chamber was severely limited. From March 1932 the government was given unrestricted powers to rule by decree, and thus by-pass the formality of parliamentary procedure. Laws were enacted restricting the right to strike and freedom of assembly. Censorship was extended soon after the 1930 election. 50 university professors were dismissed when university autonomy was curtailed in 1932.
Despite this vast power, the BBWR-Pi³sudski-military régime did virtually nothing. The economy was still stagnating well after the Depression: unemployment in real terms reached almost 40%, and 52% of Polish industry and capital was owned by foreigners. On the land, the situation was appalling: poverty and hunger increased steadily.
Taking advantage of the need to bring in legal reforms and unify Polish law in 1932, the immovability of judges was rescinded for 6 months, and the régime removed some of its critics in the judiciary. Local government was standardised and again this reduced the role of elected bodies in favour of nominations from Warsaw.
The régime's greatest problem, however, remained Brzeœæ. Following bad publicity, it decided to put on a show trial, with Czechowicz s main prosecutor, Herman Lieberman, as well as Wincenty Witos and other politicians accused of plotting to overthrow the government. The trial clearly showed that this was not their intention, but they were convicted and chose exile rather than imprisonment. More political trials followed against the PPS and the minority nationalists (particularly the Ukrainians). Soon the government established a concentration camp for offenders at Bereza Kartuska, where over 5000 were kept until WWII.
The trials made many question the régime's brutality and totalitarian policies: some members even quit the BBWR. Ex-premier Bartel protested to President Moœcicki, who himself was left with a disagreeable impression. It also highlighted the lack of ideology or political direction, other than the cult of Pi³sudski in the Sanacja.
Young people supported either the extreme left or right, or were drawn to the Nationalist parties. Polish universities became strongly anti-government and anti-Jewish.
1933 Centrolew (as a coherent opposition) virtually collapsed after Brzeœæ. The PPS suffered a great loss of prestige (due to its old association with Pi³sudski) and after Hitler's coup in 1933 it began to move to the left. A united (radical) peasant movement appeared, though there were still pro-Witos (centre-right) and pro-PPS elements. The ND remained a coherent party, and its extreme young wing, the OWP, supported by Dmowski, grew in influence, encouraging anti-semitism. The OWP was banned by the government in 1933, but was replaced by the even more openly fascist OBÓZ—NARODOWO—RADYKALNY (ONR — National Radical Camp).
1934 In January, the Sanacja régime signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany, thus ensuring peace on both the Western and Eastern fronts (following the signing of a similar treaty with the USSR in January 1932). The assassination of Bronis³aw Pieracki, Interior Minister, on 11 June, revived the nationalities question once more: the government tried to reach a compromise with the main Ukrainian organisation, UNDO, particularly since the terrorist Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), supported by Germany, had assassinated Pieracki. For both the Belorusian and Ukrainian minorities the Soviet collectivisation programme made Poland by far the lesser of two evils, even after the pacification of East Galicia (1800 arrested) in the Brzeœæ period of 1930-31.
1935 On 23 April, by quite illegal means, the Constitution was altered by simple majority in the Sejm (not 2/3). This gave vast powers (of rule by decree, nomination of governments and prime ministers, and veto of measures proposed by the Sejm) to the President, elected for seven years. In practice, this constitution perpetuated a collective dictatorship. Pi³sudski's death on 12 May, the ninth anniversary of the 1926 coup, shocked the population because his illness had been kept secret.
Pi³sudski's death caused a crisis for the régime, even though the constitution had been introduced. Although he had been neither president nor premier, his passing revealed the ideological vacuum at the heart of the Sanacja, and also raised the obvious question of his successor.
Pi³sudski had indicated that Walery S³awek should become president, but his inabilities and naiveté made Moœcicki unwilling to resign in his favour. After years of servility, Moœcicki turned into a vastly superior figure after the Marshal's death. S³awek became instead PM again. As far as the Army was concerned, the designated Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Edward Œmig³y-Rydz, another good officer, if inept politician, took over.
8 July 1935 A new electoral law curtailed opposition and prevented anti-régime candidates from standing for the Sejm. Proportional representation was abandoned in favour of 104 two-member constituencies. The first elections under the new system were held on 8 September. The number of participating voters fell dramatically (1928 - 74%; 1930 - 74%; 1935 - 46%) as the opposition parties refused to participate.
The End of the BBWR
Moœcicki felt the whole issue proved S³awek's incompetence and pressurised him to resign as PM, and he convinced a more liberal colonel, Marian ¯yndram-Koœcia³kowski, to form a cabinet on 11 October. On 30 October, the BBWR was officially dissolved (S³awek believed political parties to be superfluous). Now no coherent group held power: the Colonels were in opposition to Moœcicki about his treatment of S³awek, but could agree about nothing else. The government represented merely a status quo, leading the Pi³sudski-ites to propose Œmig³y-Rydz as the saviour from the impasse. By December he and Moœcicki were discussing the future together and would rule in tandem after Koœcia³kowski's cabinet passed the next budget through the Sejm.
1936 January: the Government declared an amnesty for those who had suffered in the Brzeœæ clampdown (but not the subsequent trials or in Bereza Kartuska). This led to serious industrial unrest in the spring of 1936. Œmig³y-Rydz pressed for Koœcia³kowski's resignation in May and an interim PM, who lasted until the outbreak of WWII, was appointed: Felicjan S³awoj-Sk³adkowski.
Moœcicki tried to control Œmigly-Rydz s growing power base in the Legions, Army and Republic at large, but the explicit recognition of Œ-R's role led to it almost surpassing the presidential one, if not legally, then certainly in practice.
Opposition ceased to all intents right across Poland, and where it did appear, was either ignored or brutally repressed. Only Piasecki's ONR-Falanga managed to develop (if only through co-operation with the régime against the Socialists). In real terms, the centre of opposition was abroad, in Paderewski s home at Morges in Switzerland. Paderewski stood for a more pro-French policy, and in February 1937 the Front Morges, an alliance between Witos, Haller and Paderewski, aiming at re-establishing a parliamentary-constitutional democracy, was formed. It had little impact on internal affairs.
OZON
With the collapse of the BBWR, Œmig³y-Rydz's speech on 24 May 1936 at the Kongres Legionistów, foreshadowed a new political alignment for government purposes. Adam Koc was entrusted with the responsibility of working out a new party, and he was much impressed by the training methods of Piasecki s ONR-Falanga. The new grouping, Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (OZON — Camp of National Unification), grew rapidly, but predictably after its foundation in February 1937 it proved to be nationalist and conservative and yet vague as to whether it was going to move towards an openly one-party system. The special position of the army and defence were stressed. It was subtly but strongly anti-Jewish, called for "economic self-sufficiency and the defence of culture". Essentially, the parties and groups of the earlier BBWR-Sanacja régime joined, but what was new was the clear alignment with ND sympathisers and the ONR.
Opposition, such as it was, came mainly from the Stronnictwo Ludowe (Peasant Party) led by Stanislaw Miko³ajczyk, a protégé of Witos, and a violent political strike was called on 15 August 1937, which called for a political amnesty and a liquidation of the Sanacja. According to official figures 1000 were arrested, 42 killed. The events shook the régime badly.
Koc at this time was becoming more overtly totalitarian in his demands, which the more radical members of the régime resented. Apparently he considered another coup to take complete power. Even Œmig³y-Rydz became uncomfortable about his antics, and so Koc was forced to resign as head of OZON.
April 1938 The new head of OZON, General Stanislaw Skwarczyñski made the movement more non-political, more like a civil defence corps, and many Falanga members withdrew. The complex struggles in the Sejm, and in OZON, led Œmig³y-Rydz and Moœcicki to dissolve parliament and call for new elections.
6/13 Nov 1938 Parliamentary elections produced only pro-OZON or OZON candidates, though this time some 67% of the electorate voted. Opposition parties boycotted the elections. Beck s triumph“ in acquiring Cieszyñ meant that afterwards, instead of the promised democratisation, stringent new press laws and a decree protecting certain interests of the state were proclaimed and Masonic organisations proscribed. In more representative local elections held at the same time, which the PPS and ND contested, analysis shows that, on a national scale, the results produce PPS 27%, OZON 29%, ND 18%, Jewish Bund 9% and others ca. 15%.
By the end of 1938, however, the crucial and only issue was the threat from Nazi Germany. Dmowski's death in February 1939 led the ND as well as other opposition groups to seek a rapprochement with the régime in the face of the German threat. Witos returned to Poland, was arrested and released immediately to begin talks on national reconciliation. Œmig³y-Rydz put a stop to these talks and encouraged a campaign against Witos, alleging a Gestapo conspiracy. The régime changed course again, jealously guarding its rights.
ECONOMY
Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, appointed as finance minister in the Koœcia³kowski cabinet of October 1935, continued balancing the budget as his priority, but the continuing depression caused the state to become more interventionist in economic affairs. Kwiatkowski therefore began to stimulate Polish industry with a Four-Year Plan (July 1936) and the development of a new Central Industrial Region, far from the Polish frontiers (near Lwów). Although unemployment remained relatively high, and agriculture stagnated, a significant economic upturn resulted, so much so that, by March 1939, the plan's investment objectives had been achieved. Further progress was cut short by the war.
1939
23 Aug German-Soviet Pact signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop.
25 Anglo-Polish Alliance signed.
1 Sept Germany invades Poland; Britain declares war upon Germany.
©Dr John Bates, 1999